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Humanitarian intervention is often conceived 
as a post-Cold War phenomenon. Understood 
as military intervention carried out in pursuit of 
humanitarian rather than strategic pursuits, it 
flourished in the 1990s due to the liberal expec-
tations linked to the prospect of a “new world 
order”. However, and especially after the US 
military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
deep concerns have been expressed regard-
ing the benefits and motives of humanitarian 
intervention. In fact, humanitarian interven-
tion is one of the most hotly disputed issues 
in global politics.1 Some see it as being guided 
by new and moral enlightened cosmopolitan 
sensibilities, stressing that in a world charac-
terised by growing interconnectedness/inter-
dependence, humanitarian intervention is jus-
tified in order to facilitate the development of a 
rule-bound global order based on shared val-
ues (peace, democracy, human rights). Others 
argue that humanitarian intervention is deep-
ly misguided and morally unacceptable, not 
only because it is usually undertaken on the 
basis of particular geopolitical reasons (selec-
tivity, double standards) but also because it is 
based on western notions (democracy, human 
rights) and, thus, the simplistic “good vs. evil” 
understanding of conflicts and global develop-
ments. As a result, considerable attention has 
focused on the attempt to establish, when, if 
ever, humanitarian intervention is justifiable. 
The Responsibility to Protect report, published 
by the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty, laid down condi-
tions for humanitarian intervention, based on 
large scale of loss of life, possibly due to eth-
nic cleansing, where the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to act itself. Such thinking 
has often involved attempts to reconceptual-
ise sovereignty, particularly through the idea of 
“responsible sovereignty” (that is, that a state’s 
right to sovereignty is conditional on fulfilling 
its duty to protect its citizens).2 
Despite the above, however, it would be wrong 
to conceive humanitarian intervention as only 
a post-Cold War phenomenon. Recently, a few 
scholars have indicated that it has long been 
recognised that intervention may be justifia-
ble on humanitarian grounds. An edited book 
by Simms and Trim examines the concept and 
practice of humanitarian from the sixteenth to 
the end of the twentieth centuries.3 Bass anal-
yses humanitarian intervention practice in the 
nineteenth century,4 and Rodogno examines 
humanitarian intervention in the Ottoman em-
pire.5 In so doing, these scholars not only indi-
cated, and rightly so, that in the nineteenth cen-
tury humanitarian intervention was invoked 
and recognised, but also raised the need to ex-
amine in more detail and depth why the nine-
teenth century was the real heyday of human-
itarian intervention. 
This task was undertaken by Alexis Heraclides 
and Ada Dialla, who provide a well-researched 
examination of how most of the issues for and 
against humanitarian intervention raised now-
adays were articulated in the nineteenth centu-
ry, both in theory and practice. To do so, not only 
do they identify the main issues now at stake 
(1–8), but, in contrast to the scholars mentioned 
above, provide a well-written and detailed anal-
ysis of the international law discourse on hu-
manitarian intervention, linking the theoretical 










arguments of those in favour or against to four 
nineteenth-century case studies. 
In chapter four (57–81), and by stressing that 
humanitarian intervention entered the scene 
as international law was developing into a sci-
entific discipline, Heraclides and Dialla have 
undertaken the exhaustive task of identifying 
and analysing the positions of international 
lawyers and jurists who addressed the ques-
tion from the 1830s to the 1930s. Prior to this 
period, the whole idea of saving those that 
were tyrannised fell under the just-war crite-
ria prevalent in the Renaissance (see the ex-
haustive second chapter of the book). 
In 1880, the term was introduced by a Brit-
ish jurist William Edward Hall, and, as the au-
thors rightly argue, this debate occurred at a 
time when there was no international legal ban 
on internal massive acts of cruelty by states, 
when independence and sovereignty were 
well-established cornerstones of internation-
al law, and when international political theory 
and political philosophy paid scant attention to 
the ethics and conditions for humanitarian in-
tervention (chapter five, 81–101). 
In particular, they examine and present the po-
sitions of no less than a hundred authoritative 
international lawyers and jurists, among them 
Henry Wheaton, Terenzio Mamiani, Robert 
Phillimore, William Vernon Harcourt, Adolph 
von Flöckher, Égide Arntz, Johann Caspar 
Bluntschli, John Westlake, Paul Pradier-Fodéré, 
Lassa Oppenheim, Antoine Rougier and Ellery 
Stowell. As it turns out, those not supportive (38 
in number) of humanitarian intervention devel-
oped their positions not only on the principles of 
sovereignty, independence and nonintervention, 
but also on practical grounds (sheer abuse by 
powerful states against weaker ones) as well 
as on the selectivity of the practice (as most in-
terventions of the age were almost exclusive-
ly against the Ottoman empire, as will be dis-
cussed below). Those in favour enjoyed a clear 
majority (68), with 48 supporting the right to in-
tervene only in exceptional cases and 14 only 
for moral or political reasons. By and large, 
those in favour regarded it as exceptional and 
acceptable only if, first, intervention was need-
ed to counter gross mistreatment that shocked 
“the moral consciousness of mankind”; second, 
the intervention was collective or quasi collec-
tive, so as to acquire international legitimacy 
and limit the abuse factor; and, third, disinter-
estedness or humanitarian concern was one of 
the main motives and justifications for interven-
ing (58). On the whole, however, as it emerges 
from Heraclides and Dialla’s study, internation-
al lawyers, at least until 1914, with a very few 
exceptions, remained attached to the dominant 
civilian-barbarian dichotomy of the age, which 
understood international law as a matter for 
the civilised states, which set the standard of 
entry into the “family of nations” (chapter three, 
31–57). This reality, and despite the fact that a 
respectable majority of the lawyers did not ar-
gue in favour of this distinction when it came to 
humanitarian intervention, not only raised the 
question of double standards but also the more 
fundamental question as to whether armed in-
tervention had become part of customary inter-
national law at the time. The majority view of 
scholars since 1920 has been that this is indeed 
the case. But, as Heraclides and Dialla stress, in 
order to claim that such a legal right did exist, it 
is inappropriate to combine those who accept-
ed it as a legal right and those that advocated it 
only on moral/political grounds. Rather, if one 
combines those totally against it and those in fa-
vour only on moral/political grounds, it is prob-
ably “debatable” whether such a right existed in 
international law at the time. However, as they 
rightly argue 
when it comes to humanitarian interven-
tion as conceived prior to the UN Charter, 
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which also included presentations (per-
emptory demands) and other forms of 
coercive interference short of actual hos-
tilities, it appears that humanitarian inter-
vention in this wider sense of the term, 
was arguably part of customary interna-
tional law … or at the very least an emerg-
ing customary norm. If our assessment 
is not wide of the mark, this is a striking 
finding, well before the era of the inter-
national law of human rights (including 
the 1948 Convention Against Genocide 
which made genocide a matter of major 
international concern) and the 1975 Hel-
sinki Final Act and the subsequent docu-
ments of the CSCE until the 1990 Copen-
hagen Document, which made respect for 
human rights, including minority rights, 
an essential factor for peace and one of 
the norms of friendly relations between 
states and criticism of abuses of human 
rights not a violation of the principle of 
non-interference in the domaine réservé 
of states (72).
In the second part of their book (101–225), Her-
aclides and Dialla examine four case studies in 
detail. These are the Greek War of Independ-
ence (1821–32), the Lebanon/Syria “massa-
cres” case (1860–61), the Balkan crisis and 
the Bulgarian case (1875–78) and the US in-
tervention in Cuba (1895–98). Their criteria for 
selecting these cases conform to the nine-
teenth-century understanding of humanitar-
ian intervention and are as follows: “(1) gov-
ernmental onslaught against unarmed people 
or atrocities by both sides in a protracted in-
ternal war; (2) humanitarian concern, that is, 
stopping, the ‘effusion of blood’, as one of the 
main reasons and official justifications for in-
tervening; (3) military intervention, ranging 
from ‘peacekeeping’ to hostilities or a full scale 
war; and (4) intervention opposed or reluctant-
ly condoned by the incumbent” (101). 
On the basis of these criteria, and with an em-
phasis on diplomatic history and the views of 
key individuals of the time, Heraclides and Di-
alla arrive at the following assessments. First-
ly, that the Greek War of Independence, wide-
ly regarded as the first case of humanitarian 
intervention, provided the “springboard for the 
emergence of a new concept” (123) in a num-
ber of ways, not only on the basis of mor-
al consciousness and the significant role of 
public opinion and civil society in favour of hu-
manitarian intervention but also in a multilat-
eral way with a repertoire that involved calls 
for a ceasefire, mediation attempts, a peace 
conference and a peace-keeping force as well 
(105–133). 
Secondly, that the Lebanon/Syria case (134–
43) contained new features that had a signifi-
cant bearing on the evolution of humanitarian 
intervention. These are: “(a) co-optation of the 
state on whose territory the outrages had tak-
en place; (b) an overseeing committee com-
prising commissioners of the great powers; 
and (c) the setting up of a new political-admin-
istrative arrangement which placed a region 
of a state under the collective tutelage of the 
great powers, limiting that state’s control over 
its sovereign territory” (143).
Thirdly, the case of the Balkan crisis and the 
Bulgarian atrocities (144–68) features not only 
the introduction of a unilateral wholesale mil-
itary intervention (war), but with the benevo-
lent neutrality of the other great powers, but 
also the far greater role of the press and public 
opinion (182–84) and finally a high-level con-
ference, the Congress of Berlin, which drasti-
cally altered the situation in the Balkans. Re-
garding the Balkan Crisis, Heraclides and Dialla 
also examine a lesser-known dimension, that 
of how “humanitarian sentiments went hand in 
hand with the patronising attitude of the ‘sav-
iour’ towards the victim” (190). This is particu-










larly the case with the aggressive stance of 
many influential Russians based on pan-na-
tionalist grounds, namely pan-Slavism, trig-
gered by humanitarian plight (169–96). Here it 
is important to stress that probably the most 
innovative part of the case studies is the ref-
erence to Russia and the Russians, which is 
little known in the international bibliography 
(169–98).
Fourthly, that in the case of the US interven-
tion in Cuba (197–222) the main features were 
mainly negative. Despite the humanitarian 
plight, the pressure of the press and public 
opinion, the expansionist agenda of the Amer-
ican administration and the results of such of 
such a humanitarian intervention (colonial-
ism/empire, no real independence for Cuba), 
underlined the “abuse” factor (215) in human-
itarian intervention, especially when a great 
power is the protagonist. 
In examining these cases, Heraclides and Di-
alla rightly stress that in comparison to the 
seven interventions of the 1990s, there were 
barely four interventions within the period un-
der examination (1821–1914). As examined, 
the powers of the time initially exhibited scepti-
cism due to their belief that it would harm their 
interests, but the problem in all cases could not 
be ignored and their diplomatic pressure pro-
duced no results. Thus, the powers intervened 
in concert (the 1860 Paris Protocols regard-
ing Lebanon), in an “alliance of the willing” (as 
with the 1827 Treaty of London and the battle 
of Navarino) or by declaring war following sev-
eral attempts at mediation (Russia in 1827 and 
1877; the US in 1898). 
The authors also stress that the humanitari-
an interventions of the period provided a clear 
manifestation of the civilised-barbarian binary. 
In three of the four cases examined, the then 
powers had to deal with Christians suffering 
at the hands of Muslims, and not of Muslims 
at the hands of Christians (as was the case in 
a few instances of Christian insurgency in the 
Greek and Bulgarian cases). Military interven-
tion was never contemplated for the excess-
es and barbarities of the powers in their colo-
nies, as such acts were not acknowledged as 
humanitarian violations. Identification with the 
Christians of the Ottoman empire was a deci-
sive factor, as was the nonidentification with 
the Muslims. Thus, the massacred Muslims 
and flow of Muslim refugees from the Balkans 
in the nineteenth century as new states were 
established and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 
passed unnoticed in Europe. 
It would, however, as the authors argue, be 
better to avoid 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
If we try to judge “reality” in the nineteenth 
century on its own terms, as perceived 
then and not anachronistically (on the ba-
sis of today’s more scrupulous stand-
ards of morality and justice), then the fol-
lowing assessment is probably more fair: 
that despite the obvious Christian bias, Eu-
rocentricm, hardly disguised “anti-Turk-
ism”, incipient racism, double standards 
and national interests, not to mention the 
unabashed “civilising” (read haughty im-
perialist) spirit reigning in those days, the 
overriding motive of European publics … 
was indeed humanitarian, to save lives and 
alleviate suffering (227).
After all, the fact that all the interventions were 
against the Ottomans does not make them ir-
relevant to the evolution of humanitarian in-
tervention. Their essential goal, it could be ar-
gued, was to prevent large-scale massacres 
or to protect Ottoman subjects against intol-
erable or outrageous treatment. Thus, they 
“were not merely better than nothing (as in the 
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case of Somalia today), too late (Rwanda) or 
leading to inordinate destruction, refugees and 
civilian deaths (Kosovo/Serbia)” (226). 
Last, but not least, Heraclides and Dialla, also 
make some very interesting and important 
propositions that are of relevance today. Their 
first proposition deals with the states and great 
powers involved. It would, as they stress (228), 
be unrealistic to examine their motives only 
on humanitarian grounds, and in so doing ne-
glect their instrumental priorities and interests. 
As evident in most cases of the post-Cold War 
period, as well as during the nineteenth centu-
ry, when vital interests of the powers involved 
were not engendered, their reaction/inaction 
would always be one of reluctance to intervene. 
In fact, why should powers intervene to defend 
“strangers” given the cost (economic, casual-
ties) and risk involved? This, as Heraclides and 
Dialla point out (4–5), is clear in the issues that 
dominate the current debate, despite the grow-
ing respect for the right to life and the limited 
resonance and changing character of sover-
eignty in a globalised interdependent world. 
Some of these issues are: Is legality through 
UN authorisation indispensable? Where should 
the threshold be for intervening with or with-
out UN authorisation? In which cases should 
interventions be made? Abuse (wrong inten-
tions and ulterior motives), and how can it be 
checked, if at all. UN authorisation, collective in-
tervention and intergovernmental supervision 
may do the trick but what if they are not forth-
coming? Should intervention take place after 
the failure of peaceful efforts or should there 
be early anticipatory and preventive interven-
tion? Moreover, there is also the need for a rea-
sonable estimate of the outcome, that is, of the 
humanitarian goals with few deaths of civilians 
and little destruction of infrastructure. Should 
the intervening powers invest in a quick exit 
strategy or a longer stay? How many casual-
ties of our “own” soldiers are acceptable?
Thus, and bearing these issues in mind, as 
Heraclides and Dialla rightly argue (229), hu-
manitarian intervention in the nineteenth cen-
tury and today should be rejected as a mere 
option for expansion and other imperialist 
strategies. It is a question of the right balance. 
If humanitarian and instrumental motives re-
inforce and justify each other, then an interven-
tion may qualify as humanitarian, for pure hu-
manitarian motives are almost impossible to 
come by. It could also be the case that the mo-
tives have always been basically humanitarian 
(in the nineteenth century and today). However, 
and given
the heavy costs and risks involved, govern-
ments have to justify their action to their 
home publics and can hardly do so on lofty 
grounds (by claiming to be the world con-
science as it were) but only by invoking, in 
effect fabricating, dire threats to vital na-
tional interests. Conversely, states or lead-
ers in order to attain the moral high ground 
– perhaps for “humanitarian prestige” or to 
act in conformity with existing “standards 
of justice” – may invoke humanitarian mo-
tives to conceal their narrow instrumental 
goals. But after a while they may come to 
regard these concocted motives as equal-
ly valid so as to attain a positive self-defini-
tion and for reasons of posterity (229).
Their second proposition is related to the de-
cisive role of the press and public opinion. In 
the nineteenth-century cases they examined, 
Heraclides and Dialla conclude that had it “not 
been for the humanitarian plight and for the 
pressure from the press and public opinion, 
no great power would have intervened. These 
powers found it increasingly difficult to appear 
insensitive to a plight that moved their citizens” 
(228). In addition, they also point to how crucial 
it was to “enlist the advocacy of celebrities, as 
for example Byron in the Greek War of Inde-










pendence” (228) in a humanitarian cause. Thus, 
the role of public opinion, the press and celeb-
rities is hardly novel, as depicted by the recent 
literature on, first, the so-called “CNN-effect”, 
which examines how the scope and speed of 
the new global media influence the foreign pol-
icy of states by bringing images and issues of 
humanitarian disasters and catastrophes to 
the immediate forefront of political and moral 
consciousness, and, second, the role of celeb-
rities in international relations, where celeb-
rities such as Angelina Jolie, George Clooney 
and Bob Geldof are prominent in humanitarian 
work and activism across the globe, bringing 
to attention a wide variety of humanitarian is-
sues and causes to a global audience. 
Heraclides and Dialla have provided a most 
comprehensive presentation of humanitar-
ian intervention in theory and practice in the 
course of the long nineteenth century. Through 
the exhaustive and well-analysed international 
law debate of the time, and the thorough pres-
entation and assessment of the cases studies 
linked with the ongoing debate they have suc-
ceeded in indicating how most of the issues for 
and against humanitarian intervention raised 
today were articulated in the long nineteenth 
century.
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